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ABSTRACT
BGP poisoning, a known side-effect of the Border Gateway
Protocol, employs BGP’s loop detection mechanism to give
an Autonomous System inbound path influence. The viabil-
ity of a range of recent network measurement, censorship-
circumvention, and DDoS defense systems depend on the
feasibility of BGP Poisoning. Simultaneously, other proposed
systems assume the opposite, that BGP Poisoning is infea-
sible in practice. Building on a foundation of active mea-
surements, we address the growing division in research and
operational ideology concerning BGP poisoning. This work
explores what is, and is not, feasible on today’s Internet.
Our results point to the fact that there is truth in both
side’s arguments. With poisoning, we can change a remote
network’s best path to our router in over 77% of cases. These
results demonstrate that BGP poisoning is viable in prac-
tice, but less than prior studies conducted in simulation only.
When successful, we observe that poisoning can steer onto
26 unique paths at maximum and nearly 3 unique paths
on average. We also explore the prevalence of filtering that
prevents poisoned path propagation. We find over 80% of ob-
served ASes from route collectors will propagate a poisoned
path of 250 ASes in length in the same manner as a non-
poisoned path of normal length. However, we discover and
characterize large amounts of ASes that do filter poisoned
paths.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet’s routing infrastructure plays a key role in ensur-
ing the reachability, availability, and reliability of networked
services. Given its importance, routing infrastructure secu-
rity underpins much of the past two decades of distributed
systems security research. However, the converse has be-
come increasingly true. Research systems now alter security-
unaware routing decisions to execute security policies.
The community has begun to harness the Border Gate-
way Protocol (BGP)[29] and the functionality it provides to
implement new offensive, defensive, and measurement sys-
tems. In particular, recent literature [2, 16, 18, 34–36] utilizes
a technique known as BGP poisoning for censorship eva-
sion, DDoS defense systems, and topology techniques used
to discover link congestion and network routing policies.
Made possible by exploiting side-effects of the protocol’s
specification, routing-capable entities implement poisoning
to steer return traffic around arbitrary Autonomous Systems
(ASes) [12] or inter-AS links.
While some research assumes Internet-scale BGP poison-
ing functions effectively for security purposes [34–36], oth-
ers assume the opposite [5, 14, 24, 25, 39]. Network measure-
ment research makes assumptions about BGP poisoning as
well [2, 6, 18]. Outside of academia, even operators make
policy decisions on the basis of (in)validated routing be-
haviors [8]. The rift between those who side with practical,
universally-executable poisoning and those who do not has
grown unchecked. With this study, we address this rift.
We exhaustively lay out real-world behavior, repercus-
sions, insights, and takeaways for BGP poisoning’s feasi-
bility on the live Internet. We do not use simulation or pas-
sive analysis, unlike all topical prior research. Instead we
actively measure poisoning at scale. The measurements pre-
sented here spanned January 2018 through May 2018, and
employed a diverse array of control-plane and data-plane
Internet infrastructure. Specifically, we utilize the PEERING
testbed [33], a cooperating research university, RIPE AT-
LAS [30], CAIDA’s BGPStream [27], RouteViews [32], and
RIPE’s Routing Information Service [31].
We found that BGP poisoning behavior lies on a broad
spectrum between extreme success and outright failure. Ar-
bitrary ASes cannot always execute BGP poisoning as the
bulk of distributed systems security research assumes. Con-
versely, path lengths of up to 250 extended by prepending
ASes propagate to nearly 99% of the ASes on the Internet
considering customer cones. Based on these and other key
findings, we offer detailed analyses, reappraisals of past work,
and recommendations for existing and future work. The rest
of this paper explores these key contributions:
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(a) Critical links congested (Nyx)
or decoy router placed (RAD)
(b) Lying about paths and prepending
ASes to avoid
(c) Loop detection triggered and new path
taken
Figure 1: Illustration of BGP Poisoning
• We conducted the largest measurement study on
BGP poisoning to date, comprising 1,460 success-
ful/1,888 total poisoning cases.We publish our dataset,
source code, and data analysis from the final results
of this paper. 1 See Section 5.
• We assess the extent and impact of poisoned path
filtering from several lenses. For this analysis, see
Section 6.
• We reassessed the Internet’s behavior with respect to
default routes and /25 reachability 1 decade after the
first exploration by Bush et al. [6]. See Sections 7.1
and 7.2 for these findings.
• We attempted to reproduce recent security papers
done in-simulation or passively, but now with active
BGP poisoning on the live Internet. See Sections 5.2.1
and 6.3.
• We constructed statistical models that serve as a
first-step towards utilizing BGP poisoning as an AS
operator,without requiring active tests or convincing
senior IT administrators. See Section 5.3.
• Finally, we discuss insights and recommendations
for the use (or threat model inclusion) of poisoning
in security and measurement work going forward.
We cover these in sections 5 through 7.
2 BGP POISONING: A PRIMER
Outbound AS-level BGP [29] paths are controlled by using
the local routing policy to force a particular installed route
as the first choice. Unfortunately, inbound paths can not
be controlled so trivially, since BGP does not allow direct
control over inbound paths. Although the Multi-Exit Dis-
criminator (MED) [22] attribute can influence a neighbor-
ing AS’s tie-breaking process, routers only employ MED
after LOCAL_PREF and AS_PATH length. This property
still leaves the decision to use the route in the hands of
the neighboring AS’s operators. Other techniques such as
1Upon acceptance.
self-prepending, employing overlapping prefixes to trigger
longest-prefix matches, and applying communities to routes
may have an effect, but all rely on the remote AS’s local
policy.
To address the need for remote AS path control, AS-level
operators may use BGP poisoning to prevent one or more
ASes from installing, utilizing, and propagating a particu-
lar path [2, 18, 36]. The main component of BGP poisoning
works with prepending. The AS utilizing the technique (poi-
soning AS) determines a set of ASes they want inbound traf-
fic to route around (poisoned ASes). In order to do this, the
poisoning AS inserts the poisoned ASNs into the AS_PATH.
According to the BGP specification [29], the poisoned ASes
should drop the poisoning AS’s path because of BGP’s loop
detection mechanism. The poisoning AS must ensure its own
ASN is still the origin (i.e. the last ASN in the AS_PATH)
to account for the presence of Route Origin Authorization
enforcement [15]. This technique affects only Internet traffic
with a final destination of the poisoning AS.
We illustrate BGP poisoning in Figure 1. In 1a, AS 1 wishes
to move the best path of AS 4 to AS 1 off of the link over AS
3. Some security-related reasons for this could include avoid-
ing congestion outside the control of the victim AS, attack-
ing censorship circumvention systems, or routing around
privacy-compromising regions of the Internet. In Figure 1b,
AS 1 will now advertise a new BGP path, but now including
the AS to avoid prepended at the end of the advertised path.
This is the "poisoning" of the link over AS 3 by AS 1. This
path will then be seen by AS 2 and AS 3. In Figure 1c, this
advertisement will propagate past AS 2 to AS 4, but will be
dropped at AS 3 due to BGP’s loop detection mechanism,
since AS 3 sees its own AS number on the path. Now that
AS 3 drops the path, it no longer has a route to AS 1 and will
not advertise the path to AS 1 over itself. At this point, the
new return path swaps to the path via AS 2, completing this
poisoning instance.
2
2.1 Key Terminology
We now cover terminology used throughout this study:
Steered AS: The steered AS is a remote AS whose traffic
is steered by the poisoning AS onto new paths revealed via
poisoning.
Steered Path: Steered AS traffic is moved onto a new steered
path by the poisoning AS’ advertisements.
Poisoning AS: The poisoning AS exerts control over the
steered AS for security, measurement, performance, or other
purposes.
Poisoned AS: Poisoned ASes are those being prepended to
advertisements by the poisoning AS to steer paths.
3 BGP POISONING: SECURITY IMPACT
A significant body of work in distributed systems security
make critical assumptions about BGP poisoning. These as-
sumptions support published systems and methods tested
in-simulation, while leaving out validation via active mea-
surement. To that end, we hope to shed light on the validity
of the assumptions made by the security community. While
our study has expanded to include analysis and assessments
of measurement research and operator assumptions, we use
this section to cover the systems and assumptions mentioned
earlier that have yet to be actively measured.
In the realm of censorship, BGP poisoning has been used
by Schuchard et al. [34] with Routing Around Decoys (RAD) to
attack censorship circumvention systems, specifically those
predicated on Decoy Routing (DR). Decoy routing is a new
technique in censorship circumvention where circumven-
tion is implemented with help from volunteer Internet au-
tonomous systems, called decoys. These decoys appear to
route traffic to a decoy destination, but instead form a covert
tunnel to the actual destination to evade the censor. In the
RAD paper, only outbound BGP paths were altered to allow
censors to route around decoys, but inbound paths could
also be altered to avoid decoy routers. In response to this
approach to routing around decoys, work by Houmansadr
et al. [14, 25] presented defenses against RAD, including the
Waterfall of Liberty. Waterfall places decoy routers on return
paths under the assumption that RAD adversaries can not
control these paths. However, our study demonstrate the
relative invalidity of this assumption.
Following from Waterfall, additional work was done by
Goldberg et al. and others [5, 23] built on top of the return
path decoy placement; thus, literature continues to emerge
while operating under assumptions not entirely true in prac-
tice. Arguing that RAD placement was infeasible financially,
Houmansadr et al. [24] showed the costs of RAD in practice,
while Gosain et al. [11] places Decoy Routers to intercept the
most traffic. Both approaches could be circumvented when
BGP poisoning works successfully at certain topological po-
sitions.
However, our findings also demonstrate the limitations
of BGP poisoning, specifically for defensive systems. In par-
ticular, Smith et al. uses BGP poisoning to provide DDoS
resistance with Nyx [36] and Katz-Bassett et al. uses poison-
ing for link failure avoidance with LIFEGUARD [18]. Nyx
uses poisoning to alter the return paths of remote ASes to a
poisoning AS, in an attempt to route the remote ASes’ traf-
fic around Link Flooding DDoS Attacks. LIFEGUARD uses
poisoning to route around localized link failures between
cloud hosts in AWS. Despite their success in simulation and
limited sample sizes in practice, the assumptions made by
both Smith and Katz-Bassett need expansion and further val-
idation. Tran et al.’s [39] feasibility study of Nyx raises issues
with poisons needed to steer traffic, but fails to demonstrate
their work via active measurements. Instead, they rely on
passive measurement and simulation. Our upcoming find-
ings have clear implications for these systems and will be
discussed later.
4 POISONING IN PRACTICE
4.1 Ethical Considerations
Because active measurements can be disruptive, we take
steps to ensure our experiments conform to ethical guide-
lines [7]. Specifically, we limit traffic sending rates along
paths to less than 1 Kbps at peak, we communicate often
with network operators, and we always send BGP RFC-
conformant paths. For a detailed discussion of the exper-
imental ethics considerations beyond this short overview,
please see Section A in the Appendix.
Figure 2: Distribution of RIPE Atlas traceroute probes at
time of experiments with overlaid BGP routers
4.2 Active Measurement Infrastructure
To evaluate the limitations and disagreements around poison-
ing presented in the prior section, we coordinated thousands
of network probes across 10% of the ASes on the Internet
and 92% of the countries around the world, 5 geographically
diverse BGP router locations —including two within Inter-
net Exchange Points (IXPs) —and 37 BGP update collectors
spread throughout the Internet. The major components of
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our measurement infrastructure are shown in Figure 3. We
leverage both existing and new infrastructure in the control-
plane and data-plane:
Control-Plane Infrastructure: We use BGP routers to
advertise paths with poisoned announcements. The routers
originate in a cooperating University AS 2 and 4 routers
from PEERING [33] advertised as AS 47065. The routers are
distributed both geographically and topologically across 3
countries: USA, Brazil, and the Netherlands. See Figure 2.
Advertisements were sent to 26 upstream transit ASes plus
300 peers. This includes two IXPs within PEERING. We em-
ploy 8 unused, unique /24 prefixes from PEERING and two
/24 prefixes 2 from the University AS. Active experiments
pause 2 minutes between measurements after each BGP ad-
vertisement, and in some cases 10 minutes or more for differ-
ent measurements depending on infrastructure constraints.
These wait times help prevent route-flap dampening [28, 41]
and ensure expiration of MRAI timers [29].
Finally, we monitor our BGP advertisements propagation
from all 37 BGP update collectors available fromCAIDA’s BG-
PStream [27]. These collectors live physically within Route-
Views [32] and RIPE NCC’s network [31].
Data-Plane Infrastructure: We utilize RIPE ATLAS [30]
to measure data-plane reactions to poison announcements.
In total, we were able to conduct traceroutes across 10% of
the ASes on the Internet and 92% of the countries around
the world. For the path steering measurements using BGP
poisoning, we only use 1 probe per AS, since we care about
measuring new AS-level return paths, not router-level. We
attempted to use every AS within the Atlas infrastructure as
long as the probe was responsive and stable.
5 STEERING RETURN PATHS
Our first set of experiments explore the degree to which a
poisoning AS can, in practice rather than simulation, change
the best path an arbitrary remote AS uses to reach the poison-
ing AS. We call this rerouting behavior return path steering.
Many security-related reasons for an AS to utilize return path
steering focus on finding paths which avoid specific ASes. As
a consequence, we are interested in more than simply if an
AS can steer returns paths. In this section we both quantify
the number of potential return paths we can steer a remote
AS onto and dive deeply into the properties of these alterna-
tive paths. This analysis includes quantifying the diversity
of transit ASes along those alternative paths, computing
weighted and unweighted minimum cuts of the topology
based on AS properties, and exploring latency differences
between alternative paths. We also attempt to reproduce past
security research and build statistical models that represent
how successfully an AS can conduct return path steering.
2We will de-anonymize ASNs and prefixes upon acceptance.
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Figure 3: Measurement infrastructure from our exper-
iments; incorporating CAIDA’s BGPStream, RIPE Atlas,
PEERING, a University AS, RouteViews, and RIPE RIS
5.1 Experimental Design
In order to explore the properties of alternative return paths,
we enumerate the paths a poisoning AS can move a remote
AS onto via return path steering. Our set of poisoning ASes
consisted of all ASes hosting a PEERING router plus the
University AS. When conducting poisoning, the poisoning
AS will only steer one remote/steered AS at a time. This is
critical to what we want to measure for security purposes.
In this component of our study, we do not intend to measure
new policies or congestion directly, as this has been done
by prior work by Anwar et al. [2] which used multiple poi-
soning ASes from PEERING to steer the same set of remote
ASes. However, Anwar et al.’s algorithm is fundamentally
similar to ours. We use all available and responsive RIPE
Atlas probes in unique ASes as steered AS targets. We col-
lect BGP updates during the process in order to ensure our
routes propagate and no disruption occurs. In total, we con-
ducted our return path enumeration experiment for 1,888
individual remote ASes, or slightly more than 3% of the IPv4
ASes that participate in BGP [3]. We present the algorithm
for the experiment on the next page. The recursive function
SteerPaths builds a poison mapping. This data structure maps
the poisoned ASes required to reach a steered path.
5.2 How Feasible is Feasible?
We successfully steered 1,460 out of 1,888 remote ASes, or
77%, onto at least one alternative return path. The unsuccess-
ful cases arose due to default routes (discussed in Section 7.2)
or poison filtering (discussed in Section 6). For each case of
successful poisoning we analyzed several metrics: the num-
ber of unique alternate steered paths discovered and ASes
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(a) Poisons Required to Discover Unique
ASes and Entire Unique Return Paths
with a Regression Line Fit
(b) RTT Comparison, Original vs New Re-
turn Paths
(c) ActiveMeasurement vs Simulation for an
Identical Set of Poisoning-Steered AS Pairs
Figure 4: Return path steeringmetrics. Figure 4a shows the number of poisons required to reach steered paths. Figure 4b shows
the difference inmeasured RTT between original paths and steered paths. Figure 4c re-evaluates Smith et al.’s Routing Around
Congestion defense.
Algorithm: Recursive path steering algorithm
recursive function SteerPaths
(src,dest ,nextPoison, currentPoisons,mappinд)
Input :poisoning AS src , steered AS dest , next poisoned AS
nextPoison, current poisons currentPoisons ,
poisonMappingmappinд
currentPath = src .pathTo(dest)
poisonDepth = currentPath.indexO f (nextPoison)
previousHop = currentPath[poisonDepth − 1]
newPoisons = currentPoisons + nextPoison
dest .poison(newPoisons)
currentPath = src .pathTo(dest)
mappinд.put(newPoisons, currentPath)
if currentPath == ∅ then
disconnected = true;
end
newPrevHop = currentPath[poisonDepth − 1]
if !disconnected && newPrevHop == previousHop then
SteerPaths(src,dest , currentPath[poisonDepth],
newPoisons,mappinд);
end
dest .poison(currentPoisons)
poisonIndex = currentPath.indexO f (nextPoison)
if currentPath[poisonDepth + 1] == dest then
SteerPaths(src,dest , currentPath[poisonDepth +
1], currentPoisons,mappinд);
end
traversed, the number of poisoned ASes needed to reach
those paths, centrality measures of the graph formed by the
steered paths, minimum cuts of this graph, and latency dif-
ferences between the original path and the alternate return
paths. Summary statistics of several of these measurements
are shown in Table 1.
Metric Result
Cases of Unsuccessful Return Path Steering 428
Cases of Successful Return Path Steering 1,460
Overall Unique New ASes 1369
Average Unique Steered Paths Per Atlas AS 2.25
Average Unique New ASes Per Atlas AS 6.45
Max Unique Steered Paths 19
Max Unique New ASes 26
Avg. Poisons Needed vs. Avg. New ASes 2.03/6.45
Unique New ASes vs. Unique Poisons Needed 1369/468
Table 1: Summary of return path steering metrics
As shown by Figure 4a, for three quarters of (steered, poi-
soning) AS pairs, between 2 and 3 unique paths were reached
on average using return path steering. However, for some
pairs, we find nearly 20 unique paths. Clearly, some ASes are
better positioned to execute return path steering. We dive
deeper into what ASes can more easily execute return path
steering using an array of statistical and machine learning
models later in Section 5.3. The number of poisons required
to reach these paths scales linearly with both the number of
discovered alternate paths and the number of unique new
ASes on those paths. This is relevant for many systems re-
lying on return path steering, as each poison increases the
advertised path length by one. We will demonstrate in Sec-
tion 6 that path length is a major factor in AS operators’
decision to filter or propagate received advertisements.
A comparison of round trip times between original and
steered paths as measured by traceroutes is shown in Fig-
ure 4b. The original and steered RTT values are nearly in-
distinguishable. We find that on average we only observed
a 2.03% increase in latency on alternative return paths, a
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positive indication that the alternative return paths have
similar performance characteristics. Interestingly, we also
found that the new steered paths when tested out of the
University AS performed 2.4% better than the original paths,
while the steered paths out of PEERING ASes performed 4%
worse than the original paths. We believe this is attributable
to the proximity of the University AS to the Internet’s core,
versus the relative distance from the PEERING ASes to the
core. These latency measurements provide supporting evi-
dence that the alternative paths are fit to carry traffic from
an approximate performance perspective, though the best
indicator of path performance would come from knowing
the bandwidth of the links traversed. Unfortunately, such
data is highly sensitive and considered an industry trade
secret for an ISP. Our approximation via the link round trip
times is our best estimate to link viability, with more real-
world applicability than the PeeringDB estimated bandwidth
model approach used in simulation by work from Smith and
Schuchard, as well as Tran and Kang [35, 36, 39].
5.2.1 Re-evaluation of Nyx. Next, we attempt to repro-
duce the performance of the Nyx Routing Around Conges-
tion (RAC) system [36] with active measurements. Using the
open source simulator from Smith et al. [37], we find 98%
routing success (ability to steer an AS around a congested
link) for the same 1,460 samples we measured in our previ-
ous experiment. We perform an exact comparison between
simulated results and those measured actively. We find that
in practice these ASes perform approximately 30% worse. We
show these findings in Figure 4c using the same metric from
the Nyx paper for the simulation and in practice comparison.
This apples-to-apples comparison illustrates that in most
cases return path steering functions in practice, but the ex-
tent of that functionality is not necessarily as substantial
as simulations based purely on AS-relationship models [40]
imply. CAIDA often shows a number of available connec-
tions larger than what we found in practice, since the CAIDA
AS-relationships dataset only attempts to show connectivity,
not policy. While CAIDA’s data represents the best possi-
ble model for simulation, it is clear that simulations relying
on the routing infrastructure should be validated by active
measurement. While Anwar et al. [2] find connectivity that
CAIDA does not, we find that when considering only a single
poisoning AS steering a single remote AS, the poisoning AS
can not achieve the full spectrum of return paths shown by
AS connectivity alone. We also find that a poisoning/steered
AS pair in simulation often had a longer original path length
than was measured in the real world. The simulator found
no original paths where the length was 3 AS hops. For the
same sample set actively measured, we found paths with
an original path lengths of 3 hops in 165/1,460 successful
steering cases.
5.2.2 Graph Theoretic Analysis of Return Path Diversity.
Figure 5a shows the average betweenness centrality of the
steered ASes traversed along new return paths between each
poisoning/steered AS pair, normalized by the number of dis-
tinct return paths found. This metric is designed to explore
the diversity of ASes along discovered return paths. An av-
erage betweenness centrality approaching 1.0 implies that
the set of possible return paths differ in AS hops very little,
while a number approaching 0.0 implies that there are few
ASes found in multiple steered paths. We see that on average,
a transited AS from the set of ASes along the original and al-
ternate return paths has a betweenness centrality of roughly
0.667. This indicates that some ASes are likely appear on the
majority of steered paths. However, steered paths are not
essentially identical.
We also compute the unweighted and weighted minimum
cut of the directed acyclic graph formed by combining the
original and alternate return paths between steered AS and
poisoning AS. Here we seek to explore the prevalence of
bottlenecks, or links that cannot be steered around, in the
set of return paths. This metric is especially meaningful for
systems like Nyx that use BGP poisoning to maintain connec-
tivity between a selected AS (the steered AS in the context of
this experiment) and a Nyx deployer (the poisoning AS) in
the presence of a DDoS attack, since a low minimum cut re-
flects an unavoidable bottleneck for DDoS to target. Figure 5b
demonstrates that in just under half of cases a single bottle-
neck exists, and for more than 90% of steered/poisoning AS
pairs, a bottleneck of at most two links exists in this graph.
To explore where in the topology these bottlenecks occur,
we constructed different methods for weighting the graph,
seen in Figure 5c. First, we assign infinite weight to all Tier-1
to Tier-1 links to effectively remove them from consideration
in the minimum cut, as the real-world capacity of links be-
tween large providers is, intuitively, much greater than links
between other ASes. Consequently, we expect they are more
difficult to degrade. Tier-1 ASes are those ASes who have no
providers, and can therefore transit traffic to any other AS
without incurring monetary costs [26]. Interestingly, this did
not change the minimum cut for any graph, meaning that
the bottlenecks did not occur as a result of single unavoidable
Tie-1 provider.
To account for the difference in link bandwidth that likely
exists between links serving larger ASes compared to smaller
ones, we also assignedweights based on CAIDA’s AS rank [1].
This rank orders ASes by their customer cone size. An AS’s
customer cone is the set of ASes that are reachable by cus-
tomer links from the AS [20]. While CAIDA’s AS rank is
in descending order (rank 1 having largest customer cone)
we invert the order for weighting purposes so that higher
link weights indicate larger endpoint AS customer cones. To
capture link capacity as a function of AS endpoint customer
6
(a) Average Normalized Steering Between-
ness
(b) Unweighted Min Cut (c) Weighted Min Cuts
Figure 5: Centrality measures of the importance of individual ASes in the directed acyclic graph formed by the original path
and steered paths. Figure 5a shows the average vertex betweenness for ASes in each of the graphs, normalized by the number
of distinct paths between steered and poisoning AS. Figure 5b and 5c show the unweighted and weighted min cuts of these
graphs.
cone size, we use both the average and maximum rank (of
link AS endpoints) as edge weights. The results demonstrate
that within the set of graphs with the same unweighted
minimum cut there exists widely different difficulties for
attackers attempting to disconnect an AS. In fact, a large plu-
rality of steered/poisoning AS pairs require a cut equivalent
to one link between ASes with an average AS rank double
that of the average AS rank (or two links between ASes of
average rank). A majority require a cut as least twice as large,
implying that bottlenecks reside on edges touching large ASes.
5.2.3 Implications For Existing Systems. For Nyx, our find-
ings agree that return path steering can reach alternative
paths. While our betweenness results show the same ASes
appear often on multiple steered paths, our reproduction
of Nyx show that in more than 60% of cases there exists at
least one steered path that avoids an arbitrary AS from the
original return path. Therefore, Nyx may help the poisoning
AS when it is an impacted bystander or when the adversary
is targeting the Internet as a whole. Our min. cut measure-
ments reveal that bottlenecks occur in these steered paths,
but it is unlikely they are on the weakest links. This means
that an adversary strategically targeting the poisoning AS
could target the min. cuts, but must work harder to discon-
nect a Nyx AS over others. In a similar manner, operators
and LIFEGUARD implementers can leverage our insights to
gain insight into the types of available paths to use after a
potential set of link failures.
For censorship tools such as Waterfall [25], the success
shown for return path steering presents issues. These sys-
tems now must consider attacks similar to Schuchard et al.’s
RAD attack [34]. However, our centrality results reveal a sig-
nificant betweenness, demonstrating that while alternative
return paths exist, on average these paths transit a partic-
ular set of ASes that can not be steered around. The min.
cut results further buttress this result, and indicate strategic
locations where censorship circumventors could place decoy
routes to prevent a routing-capable adversary from routing
around them with poisoning. Some work already approaches
finding more diverse paths [4, 11, 24], but these systems also
do not consider adversaries which can steer traffic around
decoys on the return path. We suggest future studies exam-
ine poisoning feasibility from routers in strongly censoring
nations such as China or Iran.
5.3 Predicting Successful Steering
To begin to understand which ASes can execute return path
steering most successfully, we have constructed a set of sta-
tistical models. These models 1) predict the most successful
ASes able to steer traffic with poisoning and 2) determine the
most important predictors for success of return path steer-
ing. Using the entire 1,460 sample dataset, we extract the
following features from the real world active measurement
data: distance on original path from poisoning AS to steered
AS, poisoning AS’s next-hop AS Rank, the steered next-hop
AS rank, original path average edge betweenness, steered AS
Rank, and original path average latency (over all hops). We
selected these features based on properties that can be easily
determined using standard traceroutes and by referencing
open datasets such as CAIDA’s AS Rank [1].
We first split the data into a 70%/30% train-test-split. Then
we scale the data by removing the mean and scaling to
unit variance. In total, we employ 4 models: 4-layer fully-
connected neural network, decision tree classifier, random
forest ensemble classifier, and support vector machine. After
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(a) ROC curves for different models predict-
ing ASes that can execute return path steer-
ing
(b) Features analyzedwith Principal Compo-
nent Analysis, where Index 2 is the Poison-
ing AS’s Next-Hop AS Rank
(c) Distribution of the Poisoning AS Next-
Hop AS Rank vs the outcome of the return
path steering
Figure 6: Predicting Successful Return Path Steering
fitting the data, we test the models with a 10-fold cross-
validation. Then, we plot Receiver Operating Characteristic
curves in Figure 6a, which show the success of a given AS at
return path steering. Specifically, the curves show the true
positive rate vs. false positive rate distribution across models.
Overall, the models perform strongly. At 80.80% accuracy,
the decision tree classifier both trains and tests new samples
the quickest at < 1 second and is the most explainable. Ex-
plainability of machine learning models is critical here, since
operators must inform their network administrators why or
why not their network is fit for employing return path steer-
ing. Using only the feature vectors and their distribution, we
now examine the features that express the most variance.
Figure 6b shows a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) al-
gorithm used to rank all features by their mean and variance.
The order of the feature indices is the same as presented
in the beginning of this section. The features with higher
means indicate the more important properties of the poi-
soning AS, steered AS, and pre-steering AS path. We find
the most important predictor is the next-hop AS rank of the
poisoning AS. As the number of links to steer onto increases,
the poisoning AS finds more unique paths. We can see this
by examining Figure 6b Feature Index 2. The successful cases
evolve from influential ASes as the poisoning ASes’ next-hop
provider or peer. By drilling down further into the distribu-
tion, we see in Figure 6c unsuccessful cases clustered around
much smaller ASes. Note that path lengths average around 4
hops on the current Internet. So, in cases where a poisoning
AS cannot steer through the available paths at its next-hop,
other diverse AS choices should exist at the later hops. Per-
haps counter-intuitively, the least important predictor is the
AS rank of the steered AS. This indicates that the relative in-
fluence, or size, of the steered AS does not affect a poisoning
ASes’ ability to steer them.
6 EXTENT AND IMPACT OF FILTERING
In this section we present experiments that uncover ASes
throughout the Internet which refuse to propagate BGP paths
with poisoned ASes prepended. We term this effect poison
filtering. We present evidence for how often ASes conduct
poison filtering, a behavior that impacts the success of BGP
poisoning. We explore how much ASes propagate poisoned
routes, how long of poisoned paths can be propagated, and
additionally conduct a rigorous graph-theoretical analysis of
the specific ASes by size inferred to be filtering long poisoned
paths. We also attempt to reproduce recent work by Tran &
Kang et al. [39] who used a dataset gathered through passive
measurement (as opposed to active BGP measurements). In
this analysis, we yet again demonstrate that simulation or
passive measurement is not enough to empirically determine
the behavior of the Internet.
6.1 Poisoning Large ASes
Systems which depend on return path steering need the
ability to avoid ASes of a variety of sizes. Since a poison is
essentially a lie about the AS level path, it is natural to ask
if ASes disregard lies about large ASes. This type of poison
filtering would prevent systems using return path steering
from avoiding key ASes in the topology. In order to explore
this, we measured the ability to propagate poisoned routes
containing various sizes of poisoned ASes.
6.1.1 Experimental Design. First, we randomly sampled
5% of ASes seen in BGP updates from January 2018 by their
degree of connectivity. In cases (like Cogent) where an AS
has a unique degree of connectivity, we sample just that
AS. However, when many ASes share a degree (e.g., 3), we
sample 5% of those ASes uniform at random. With these
ASes, we proceeded to advertise poisoned paths with one
sampled AS prepended as the poison per advertisement. This
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announcement would appear asASP ,ASF ,ASP , whereASP is
our poisoning AS or measurement point,ASF is the AS being
tested for poison filtering. Prior work has found that the
relative connectivity of an AS often determines its reaction
to anomalous Internet events [6, 26] due to larger ASes nec-
essarily enforcing certain policies based on the customers it
serves. For each iteration, we initially announce the normal,
non-poisoned prefix to all providers and peers connected
to the University’s AS. After waiting 40 minutes for BGP-
Stream to continuously pull from update collectors, we then
fetch all observed updates from the prior 40 minutes, though
our updates general propagated within 30 seconds when
observed from the actual collector. We then measured how
many unique ASes were observed advertising the original
announcement. 3
With a baseline taken for the non-poisoned announcement
per prefix, we repeated this process, but now poisoning ASes
by degree from high-low in the path example shown earlier.
Again, we wait 40 minutes before collecting all updates and
additionally implicitly withdraw each poisoned path after
each iteration. We then compute the normalized percent of
ASes propagating the poisoned paths. This measures the
fraction of ASes advertising specific poisoned paths versus
those who advertised the non-poisoned baseline path from
the equivalent poisoning AS and poisoned prefix. If an AS
propagated the non-poisoned path from ourAS, and they also
propagated a poisoned path, then the normalized percent is
higher. In other words, this metric illustrates the percentage
of ASes from our random sample that do not employ poison
filtering.
6.1.2 Results and Analysis. The results of this measure-
ment are shown in Figure 7. We have aggregated the normal-
ized propagation percentages by AS degree into averages in
bins of AS degrees from 0 to 99, 100 - 199, ..., 2300 - 2399.
We observe that for AS degrees of less than 2,500, the ASes
accepting and propagating the poisoned ASes is roughly the
same, with between 70% to 80% of ASes continuing to propa-
gate poisons. We did not show the most connected ASes in
Figure 7 due to their outlier status; instead, the top 10 ASes
by degree are shown with their propagation data and other
relevant AS metadata in Table 2. Notably, the largest degree
AS is Hurricane Electric, a nearly Tier-1 4 at 7,064 degree.
Hurricane Electric has roughly 20% propagation compared
to ASes with under 2,500 customers at roughly 70% propaga-
tion. In fact, the extent to which ASes refuse to propagate
high degree poisons is confined to a very small sample of
high-degree ASes. Only 4 have a propagation percentage of
3BGP convergence happens nearly instantly with poisoned routes, see
LIFEGUARD [18].
4Hurricane Electric provides connectivity to all other Tier 1 ASes except
Cogent.
Figure 7: Filtering of AS paths increases as the poisoned AS
increases in degree, an approximation for its influence on
the Internet
Rank
by De-
gree
ASN and Name Degree
Number
of Cus-
tomers
Registered
Country by ASN
Normalized
Propagation
Percentage
1 6939 - Hurricane Electric 7064 1202 United States 11.9%
2 174 - Cogent 5352 5272 United States 11.6%
3 3356 - Level 3 4980 4898 United States 11.6%
4 24482 - SG.GS 3382 24 Singapore 96.1%
5 3549 - Level 3 GBLX 2538 2446 Unites States 11.6%
6 7018 - AT&T 2373 2330 United States 0.05%
7 58511 - Anycast 2351 13 Australia 60.1%
8 49605 - IVO 2193 11 Italy 66.7%
9 8492 - OBIT Ltd. 2153 46 Russia 71.4%
10 8220 - COLT Tech. Grp. 2143 716 United Kingdom 78.2%
Table 2: The extent of propagation of the top 10 ASes poi-
soned by their overall degree of connectivity
less than 30%, with AS degrees of 2,538, 4,980, 5,352, and
7,064.
6.1.3 Discussion. First, systems such as Nyx [36] and
RAD [34] assume all ASes do not conduct poison filtering.
We present evidence that significant parts of the Internet
do not respect poisoning, especially for the small amount
of ASes with degrees greater than 1,000. This finding exem-
plifies the reason why systems such as Nyx do not find the
nearly limitless available paths in practice as what is shown
via CAIDA data. To that end, future systems employing BGP
poisoning for defensive or offensive purposes should not
assume all available paths can be steered onto.
For decoy-routing systems, deployers should aim to place
decoys where adversarial ASes are topologically blocked by
poison filtering. In scenarios where decoy placement lever-
ages these strategies, the censors may face a losing scenario.
Also shown in Table 2, the number of customers an AS has
seems to indicate the extent of poison filtering. For exam-
ple, despite AS 24482 (an ISP in Singapore) having the 4th
highest level of AS connectivity, it only provides direct cus-
tomer transit to 24 ASes. Accordingly, this Singaporean AS
has a much higher propagation percentage relative to ASes
with similar degree but more customers. In the case of AS
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24482, the non-transit ASes pumping up the AS degree may
be peers. Clearly, while paths with larger ASes seen in poi-
soned paths may be filtered more often, it is not always the
case based on AS 24482. With over 3000 ASes reported as
connected by CAIDA [40], the amount of propagation was
still 96% of a normal non-poisoned path.
6.2 Propagating Long AS Paths
Our next experiment investigates the maximum amount of
poisoned ASes a poisoning AS can spread throughout the
Internet via successively longer path lengths. In existing
security systems, Nyx [36] advertises long poisoned paths
to avoid dragging along non-critical traffic when steering
remote ASes around congestion. RAD [34] and censorship
tools using BGP poisoning must rely on many poisons to
steer traffic around decoy routers. AS relationship and pol-
icy inference methods could use our path steering algorithm
from Section 5 coupled with longer poisoned paths to explore
broader AS-to-AS business relationships [2]. Congestion dis-
covery systems could also benefit from greater topological
visibility.
Figure 8: With paths up to 250 in length, we found over 80%
of ASes treated 250-length paths the same as normal paths
(Regression Fit of Order 2)
To that end, we have conducted what we believe is the
most exhaustive measurement of maximum path length on the
Internet. This experiment provides valuable information on
whether common models of routing hold in practice. Though
the BGP specification [29] does not place an upper bound
on path length, the BGP best practices RFC [8] recommends
that excessively long paths should be filtered. Furthermore,
statistics from the APNIC routing registry [3] show most
maximum path lengths observed well-under what should be
possible. Many Cisco forum posts also hint at operators that
assume all paths are filtered over 50 in length. Fortunately,
we were able to conduct our experiment from the university
AS with permission over two large ISP transit links, without
the path length restrictions of PEERING. The University AS’s
providers have the explicit policy of filtering BGP advertise-
ments longer than 255 hops. Therefore, even though paths
may extend beyond this in some router’s policies, we can
only observe the propagation of path lengths up to 255.
6.2.1 Experimental Design. Similar to the poison-filtering
approach in Section 6, we first announce a normal baseline
path with no poisons. After collecting the baseline number
of ASes advertising the normal path and withdrawing the
baseline advertisement, we then iteratively poison paths of
increasing lengths in intervals of 40minutes, from 1 poisoned
AS prepended to the path to 135 poisons by one at a time.
Once we reached 135 poisons, we shifted to poisoning in
successive iterations of 5, going from 135 to 500. After every
iteration of path length increase, we implicitly withdraw
the prior advertisement. During propagation throughout the
Internet, we collect all BGP updates from collectors managed
by BGPStream [27], which we again use to measure the
normalized percentage of ASes propagating the poisoned
paths. In practice, the path would look similar to the path
in Equation 1, where ASI , AS J , and ASK are normal ASes
forwarding the prefix; ASOriд is the poisoning AS; and ASP1
through ASPn are the prepended poisons.
ASI , AS J , ASK , ASOriд , ASP1 , ASP2 , ASP3 , ..., ASPn , ASOriд (1)
We conducted this experiment with two sets of ASes to
prepend. 1) Randomly sampled, in-use ASes from the CAIDA
topology to most closely mirror a poisoned path needed for
return path steering, and 2) using the University AS as a self-
prepend. We ensured part of the in-use AS sample included
both ASes on the edge of the topology (those with no cus-
tomers), as well as transit ASes small and large (those with
more than 5 customers) according to prior classifications of
AS types by UCLA [26]. These experiments were carried out
over the course of several days.
6.2.2 Results and Discussion. Displayed in Figure 8 for
both the randomly sampled ASes from CAIDA and for the
self-prepended University AS, we present a rigorously eval-
uated upper bound on the max path length of the Internet of
251. This path was propagated to over 99% of the Internet
when including customer cones of AS’s forwarding the path.
This included highly connected ASes such as Level 3 and
Cogent. Figure 8 also matches an operator’s intuition that
as paths grow longer, they are less accepted throughout the
Internet, though still roughly 75% of BGP collectors observed
the longest path lengths detected.
With this information, systems such as Nyx [36] now have
an upper bound on which to base the amount of poisoned
ASes used at any given time. Since Smith et al. did not limit
the poisons, our reproduction of Nyx earlier incorporates
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(a) Tier-1 and Large ISPs (b) Small ISPs and Stub ASes (c) MANRS vs non-MANRS ASes
Figure 9:Minimumandmaximum inferred filtering for ASes classified by tier andMANRSmembership, eachwith a regression
fit of order 1 to show the overall trend
this poison limit, finding less success overall when actively
steering return paths. For systems that infer previously un-
known Internet topology relationships, the maximum length
of 251 poisoned ASes serves as a constraint on path steering
algorithms.When attempting to route aroundmany localized
failures, as Katz-Bassett et al. [18] did between Amazon AWS
instances in LIFEGUARD, this maximum length limits the
amount of path steering in practice that can be achieved. We
also see implications for RAD [34] and other decoy routing
adversaries: the more poisons possible, the harder a defense
mechanism such as Waterfall and others [5, 24, 25] must
work to place decoy routers.
6.3 ASes Filtering Long Paths
Here we investigate which ASes are filtering paths. Our
inference is based on a comparison on paths received by
route reflectors at each advertisement of successively greater
length. First, we build a directed acyclic graph D of all paths
p observed on paths from the University AS to reflectors.
The nodes of D are ASes appearing on paths; edges repre-
sent links between them. Next, for each advertisement i of
successively greater path length, we build a set of ASes Ai
composed of all ASes appearing on our advertised paths that
reached route reflectors. Finally, we remove all a ∈ Ai from
a copy of D, Di . For each weakly connected component re-
maining in Di , we learn that 1) at minimum, the roots of
each component filtered the advertisement, and 2) at maxi-
mum, all AS nodes a ∈ Di filtered it. Using this method, we
iteratively build maximum and minimum inferred filtering
AS sets for every path length in our experiment.
Our results are grouped using the aforementioned, widely-
adopted AS classification scheme presented in [26]. ASes are
divided into Tier-1 (can transit traffic to all ASes without
compensation and form a clique), Large ISPs with over 50
customers, Small ISPs with between 5 and 50 customers,
and Stub ASes, those with less than 5 customers. Figure 9a
displays our results for Tier-1s and Large ISPs; Figure 9b
gives the same information for Small ISPs and Stub ASes.
Naturally, the ephemeral structure of the Internet topology
introduces noise into our results. Additionally, it is more
difficult to draw conclusions about Tier-1 and Large ISP
filtering behavior using our method, as the minimum and
maximum inferences diverge significantly. This is likely due
to advertisements being filtered before reaching these ASes
as they propagate outward from the University AS. So, these
ASes are rarely the root of the weakly connected components
used to infer minimum filtering, and we conjecture that the
true filtering rate for these classes is closer to the maximum
inference.
Overall, the results indicate that Tier-1’s and Large ISPs
filter long paths more aggressively than Small ISPs and Stub
ASes, and that AS filtering policies are highly fragmented.
In a feasibility study on Nyx by Tran et al.’s at IEEE S&P
2019 [39], the authors utilize a distribution of observed path
lengths from passive measurement of 2 billion paths from
Akamai to hypothesize about AS filtering rates. In short,
they suggest that some filtering occurs on paths of length
30 - 75, no increase in filtering occurs between 75 and 255,
and paths of length 255 or greater are almost universally
filtered. We were limited by University AS provider policy
from experimenting with paths over length 255, but their
findings align well with our own for Small ISPs and Stub
ASes. For the larger ASes, our experiments indicate that the
rate of filtering does in fact increase after a path length of
75. Additionally, our results capture the intuition that larger,
more influential ASes would filter poisoned paths more often.
We find that of all tiers of ASes, the Tier 1 ASes filter most,
while larger ISPs filter less but close behind Tier 1 ASes
shown in Figure 9a. Finally, small ISPs and stub ASes filter
very little as shown by Figure 9b.
6.4 Walking the Walk
MANRS [21], Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security,
is a global Internet routing security initiative that develops
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Measurement Number of Instances
Fraction of Total Samples with
Only 1 Provider (not multi-homed) 28.7% (419 / 1,460 total samples)
Fraction of Total Multi-Homed
Samples with Default Routes
48.6% (506 / 1,041 multi-homed
samples)
Fraction of Transit ASes with
Default Routes 26.8% (196 / 731 total Transit ASes)
Fraction of Stub/Edge/Fringe ASes
with Default Routes 36.7% (310 / 845 total Fringe ASes)
Table 3: Default Route Findings
and publishes best practices for network operators. Path fil-
tering is one area of concern for MANRS, and they publish
standards for following RPKI and other BGP security mech-
anisms that member ASes are expected to implement. The
120+ MANRS ASes represent a distinct set of ASes that in-
tuitively should be most likely to filter BGP advertisements
similar to poisoned updates. They include Cogent, Charter
Communications, CenturyLink, and Google.
In Figure 9c, we display the results of the same filtering
inference algorithm used in the previous section, with results
divided by MANRS and non-MANRS ASes. We observe a
significant deviation in the inferred filtering range between
MANRS and non-MANRS ASes, suggesting that MANRS
operators may implement tighter filtering policies. This key
result indicates that an ISP’s participation in an Internet
consortium such as MANRS may actually correspond with
stricter implementations by the operators responsible for
day-to-day network activity and filtering policy, rather than
aligningwithMANRS only at an organizational level.We aim
to explore these kinds of human/business-centric routing
policies more in future work.
7 REASSESSING REACHABILITY
As part of our study, we setup our infrastructure to attempt
to reproduce Internet measurements from nearly a decade
ago by Bush et al. in Internet Optometry at IMC 2009 [6].
These measurements from 2009 have a distinct impact on
the feasibility of BGP poisoning. This section presents our
findings for an Internet in 2018 with over 60,000 ASes and
estimated 3.8 billion unique users, compared to nearly 25,000
ASes and 1.7 billion users in 2009 [3, 10]. Once again, we
found cases in this evaluation where common assumptions
from the operator community did not coincide with actively
measured Internet behavior.
7.1 Declining Presence of Default Routes
Default routes exist when an AS has two or more providers
and refuses to choose a second providerwhen the first provider
is "removed" from the topology via BGP poisoning. A poison-
ing AS can theoretically remove the first provider from the
steered AS’s topology by causing the first provider to drop
(and not propagate) its route to the poisoning AS. However,
when measured in 2009 [6], this did not always occur when
poisoning. We now re-examine default routing in 2018.
Prefix
Length Measurement Findings
Timespan of
Measurement
/25 BGP Observability Seen at 21/37 (56.7%)collectors 96 hours of collection
/25 Traceroute Reachability 31% reached /25prefix on average
7 hours; 5,000 distinct
traceroutes every 1
hour
/24 BGP Observability Seen at 34/37 (91.8%)collectors 96 hours of collection
Table 4: /25 Reachability Findings
We found 330/1,460 successful poisoning cases exhibited
default routes at the steering AS’s next hop. Thus, steering
traffic onto a second, third, or other provider bordering the
remote AS was impossible for these ASes. As shown by Ta-
ble 3, we examined the properties of these ASes by their
transit or fringe status. Default routes existed for 26.8% of
the transit ASes we sampled, those being ASes with 5 or
more customers. We also found that 36.7% of the fringe ASes,
or those with less than 5 customers, had default routes. In
2009, 77% of stub ASes had default routes (out of 24,224 ASes
measured from the poisoner with the ping utility). In 2018,
we found 36.7% of stubs had default routes (out of 845 ASes
measured from the steered AS with RIPE Atlas probes using
traceroute).
Security implications of default routing also exist. Based
on the prevalence of default routes, decoy routing systems [5,
24, 25] could optimize placement of decoy systems on the
immediate next-hop of remote ASes which a RAD [34] ad-
versary wishes to steer. This approach may yield stronger
security guarantees against poisoning-equipped adversaries
when the middle of the path exhibits strong compatibility
with poisoning. For systems such as Nyx [36], a steered AS
which has a default route may not be able to provide QoS to
its customers when under a direct DDoS. This is due to the
limited ability for a poisoning AS to steer the target AS onto
a second, non-impacted provider, especially if the DDoS is
on the default link.
7.2 Growth of /25 Reachability
When executing return path steering, an originating AS uti-
lizing poisoning on a set of their own prefixes can cause the
poisoned ASes and their traffic to lose connectivity to the
poisoning AS’s prefixes. This loss of reachability occurs by
default with poisoning. Fortunately, a poisoning AS can still
maintain reachability given a sufficient allocation of prefixes.
However, not all ASes benefit from an ample supply of con-
trolled prefixes. To maintain reachability while poisoning, an
AS must have both a more specific prefix and a less specific
prefix. Current best practice documents recommend ASes
filter advertisements longer than /24 [8]. Therefore, any AS
which only has /24 prefixes available will lose reachability to
poisoned ASes unless it can advertise a /25 as the poisoned
prefix and use the /24 as the covering prefix. We searched
the BGP RIB for an AS’s shortest advertised prefix length
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and found that 48% of them only have /24 prefixes adver-
tised, except for ASes that may have had /25’s already in the
default free zone. For an in-depth examination of BGP prefix
delegation and who gets the privilege of many prefixes, see
recent work by Krenc et al. [19]. With this necessary primi-
tive for poisoning in mind, we set out to examine the amount
of reachability a /24-only poisoning AS could retain to the
poisoned ASes.
7.2.1 Experimental Approach. For the control-plane mea-
surement, we started by announcing a unique /24 across
all 8 prefixes. Over the following 96 hours, we collected ag-
gregated BGP updates from BGPStream [27]. This provides
a baseline number of ASes propagating the path. We then
withdrew each /24 prefix. Next, we announced a /25 prefix
from the same set of locations across PEERING and the Uni-
versity AS, collecting the number of updates in the same
manner again over 96 hours. With these two sets of ASes,
we compute the normalized percent of ASes propagating the
/24 versus the /25.
Next we measure data-plane reachability. We announced a
/25 from our 8 prefixes. Then we scheduled 5,000 traceroutes
per hour for 7 hours from globally distributed nodes (i.e.
randomly chosen by the RIPE Atlas API with the "global"
option). These traceroutes had a destination set to the /25
advertising ASes.We recorded the number of traceroutes that
reached the /25, noting this as the approximate reachability
of the /25. We opted not to do the traceroutes for the /24
both due to PEERING being used for other experiments and
because we expect a /24 to be reachable except in the case of
faulty Atlas probes.
7.2.2 Results and Discussion. Our results from these ex-
periments are shown in Table 4. We found that the current
data-plane reachability of a /25 is roughly 30%, while the
number of ASes propagating a /25 BGP announcement is
over 50%, or 50x higher than 2009 results in Bush et al. [6].
Notably, our analysis shows that the 48% of ASes without
sufficient recommended prefixes to steer traffic actually can
maintain reachability. We note that our results may not be
able to be directly compared with Bush’s work due to the use
of traceroutes here over ping, but the comparison at least
serves as a measuring stick for the growing Internet.
Our findings also have crucial implications for both exist-
ing and future security systems. Censor that do not have a
less specific prefix than a /24 will be unreachable by ASes af-
fected by path steering for a non-negligible amount of steered
ASes. This may dampen a RAD [34] adversaries success in
terms of economic means by lost traffic, while strengthen-
ing the case for circumvention tools [5, 24, 25]. Though loss
of reachability may not be an issue for censorship entities
in general, smaller censoring nations may sustain signifi-
cant economic costs. Smaller nations may have few egress
BGP paths to the broader Internet. Any additional sacrificed
reachability may have substantial impacts on the businesses
and users behind the border. However, the cases where BGP
routers propagate a /25 may be enough in some attack scenar-
ios for a RAD adversary, though this is topology-dependent
given a poisoning AS. We recommend that future iterations
of the decoy routing attack and defense schemes factor in
our findings by evaluating their success for classes of ASes
with only a /24 prefix.
As a defensive mechanism, operators of systems such as
Nyx and LIFEGUARD [36] must be willing to sustain losses
of reachability. Defensive measures must account for our
new discoveries of AS reachability for ASes with few pre-
fixes. In the context of other Internet measurement research,
the loss of reachability is less relevant. An AS using BGP
poisoning purely as a means to gain greater visibility into
the Internet, whether for security or another measurement
purpose, may have additional prefixes for production traffic
(as in our case) and would likely not need reachability to
intermittently poisoned paths.
8 RELATEDWORK
In the background on security impact in Section 3, we cov-
ered relevant security and measurement literature. Here, we
cover related Internet measurement research. LIFEGUARD
from Katz-Bassett et al. [17, 18] as well as Anwar et al.’s
Interdomain Policy exploration [2] use algorithm similar
to our return path steering methodology. They addressed
steering return traffic around link failures between Amazon
EC2 servers distributed between data centers. However, our
algorithm explores greater depths in its breadth-first search
of all possible paths from a single remote AS, rather than ag-
gregating paths available from many poisoning ASes. While
not directly related to our steering algorithm, work on BGP
communities can influence inbound paths similarly to poi-
soning. Communities in the wild have been studied recently
by Streibelt et al. [38]. Outside of BGP, paths can be steered
by other means, including the data-plane [13] by SWIFT or
newer, Internet architectures such as SCION [42].
9 CONCLUSIONS
BGP poisoning, a burgeoning technique for steering the re-
turn paths of autonomous systems, has serious implications
for the success or failure in practice of existing and future In-
ternet research. Impacted systems include, but are not limited
to, RAD [34], Waterfall of Liberty [25], Nyx [36, 39], LIFE-
GUARD [18], and Internet Optometry [6]. By conducting an
extensive measurement study, we offer (in)validation, recom-
mendations, and insight to these and future systems intend-
ing to leverage BGP poisoning. Our collection of Internet-
scale measurements address the universal feasibility of BGP
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poisoning as a security primitive and useful tool for mea-
surement pursuits. Our contributions can be summarized as
follows:
• We presented the largest measurement study on BGP
poisoning to date (n=1,460/1,888 successful). 5
• We assess the extent and impact of poisoned path
filtering from several lenses.
• We reassessed the Internet’s behavior with respect
to default routes and /25 reachability 1 decade after
the first exploration.
• We reproduced several recent security papers with
active, not passive, measurements.
• We constructed statistical models that serve as a
first-step towards utilizing BGP poisoning as an AS
operator.
• Finally, we presented many insights and recommen-
dations for BGP poisoning as a tool in security and
measurement research going forward.
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A ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Our study conducts active measurements of routing behav-
ior on the live Internet. As a result, we took several steps
to ensure that our experiments did not result in the disrup-
tion of Internet traffic. First, we engaged with the operator
community and leveraged their expertise throughout our
experiments. Second, we designed experiments to have min-
imal impact on routers and the normal network traffic they
carry. In this section we will touch on these steps.
WorkingwithOperators: To ensure carewas taken through-
out all experiments, we worked extensively with the network
operator responsible for campus-wide connectivity, quality-
of-service, and routing at the university AS used in our exper-
iments. This individual assisted in designing our experiments
such that the concerns of external network operators on the
Internet would not be affected adversely by our study, while
also not biasing our results. In addition to the university op-
erator, we worked extensively with PEERING operators from
USC and Columbia throughout our study’s design and exe-
cution. PEERING operators have a large amount of collective
experience running active measurements on the Internet,
which we leveraged to build non-disruptive experiments.
Significant care was taken to notify various groups of our
activities. In accordance with the PEERING ethics policy, we
announced to the RIPE and NANOG mailing lists prior to
experiments the details of the study, allowing operators the
ability to opt out. Over the course of our experiments we
monitored our own emails and the mailing lists. In total, 4
emails were received and are shown in Section A.1 of the
Appendix along with explanations. Of the e-mails received,
no parties asked to opt-out. For each email received, we re-
sponded promptly, explained our study, and incorporated
any feedback provided.
Minimizing Experimental Impact: BGP path selection
is conducted on a per-prefix basis. Meaning that advertise-
ments for a particular prefix will only impact the routing
of data bound for hosts in that prefix. The prefixes used for
our experimental BGP advertisements were allocated either
by PEERING or the University for the express purpose of
conducting these tests. Outside of a single host that received
traceroutes, no other hosts resided inside these IP prefixes.
No traffic other than traceroutes executed as part of our ex-
periments were re-routed. This includes traffic for other IP
prefixes owned by the poisoning AS and any traffic to or
from the poisoned ASes.
Another potential concern is the amount of added, and
potentially unexpected, bandwidth load we place on links
we steer routes onto. Since the only traffic that was re-routed
as a result of the experiments was traceroute traffic bound
for our own host, this added traffic load was exceptionally
low. The bandwidth consumed by our measurements did not
exceed 1 Kbps at peak.
Besides minimizing non-experimental traffic, we mini-
mized the impact our BGP advertisements had on the routers
themselves. Our BGP advertisements were spaced in inter-
vals also ranging from tens of minutes up to hours. Resulting
in a negligible increase to router workloads given that on
average BGP routers currently receive 16 updates per second
during normal operation [3]. All updates were withdrawn
at the conclusion of each experiment, preventing unneces-
sary updates occupying space in routing tables. Furthermore,
all BGP updates conformed to the BGP RFC and were not
malformed in any way.
The largest concern to operators were our experiments
measuring the propagation of long paths on the Internet,
described earlier in Section 6.2. Several historical incidents,
most notably the SuproNet incident [9], have demonstrated
that exceptionally long AS level paths can potentially cause
instability in BGP speakers. Underscoring this point were
emails from operators on the NANOG mailing list 6 that ap-
peared several months before our experiments complaining
about instability in Quagga routers as a result of the adver-
tisement of AS paths in excess of 1,000 ASes. As a result, all
experiments involving long paths conformed to the filtering
policies of our next hop providers. In the case of PEERING
6https://lists.gt.net/nanog/users/195871?search_string=bill%20herrin;
#195871
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experiments, administrators limited our advertisements to
15 hops, and for the University, our upstream providers (two
large transit providers located primarily in the United States)
limited us to advertisements of 255 total ASes. These limits
were enforced with filters both in the experimental infras-
tructure and at the upstream provider. In addition, such ex-
periments were conducted with 40 minute intervals between
announcements in an effort to allow operators to contact us
in the case of any instability resulting from our experiments.
A.1 Communications Received by
Network Operators
We received emails from network operators at Hurricane
Electric, the Linux Foundation, Carpathia (a small ISP), and a
security researcher from Yahoo!/Oath. None of the operators
attributed malice to the discovery of our anomalous path
advertisements, though several warned us that our routers
were behaving oddly and that we should investigate them.
When we received an email pointing out our router’s be-
havior, we immediately took steps to reduce the amount of
poisons we would try at once, the number of updates during
a given amount of time, and additionally not poisoning the
notifying ASes specifically.
This revealed yet another insight: even among the network
operator community, BGP poisoning can often be mistaken
for router-error, and not intentional operator actions. Fur-
thermore, one researcher noted that the long path announce-
ment experiment gave reminder to the 2009 incident where
an AS announced paths in the thousands of ASes long con-
sistently for several hours, far longer than our experiments,
causing many unstable routers on the fringe of the Internet
to crash [9]. All three anonymized emails 7 are shown in
Figure 10.
B RIPE ATLAS CHALLENGES
Challenges abounded while attempting to measure tracer-
outes from RIPE ATLAS, including failed responses from
the ATLAS API, numerous undocumented responses, and
unknown and often seemingly random failures. It was de-
termined that using traceroutes to perform AS poisoning
validation was a better method than measuring the control-
plane when taking into consideration that it is a true test of
how traffic flows, the limitations of BGPStream’s large delay
and intermittent reliability, and the fact that RIPE ATLAS
having a more widespread sensor deployment.
Even though traceroutes were a better testbed than route
servers, there were still multiple issues encountered with
using this method. ATLAS allows for a max_hops parame-
ter used to set the largest TTL used while performing the
7Specific email date, names, times, and ASNs that would de-anonymize the
submission or e-mail sender’s name are redacted.
Firmware Probe Percentage
4910 52.4
4790 26.2
4900 18.2
4780 3.2
traceroute, but after reviewing multiple traceroutes, it was
apparent that the probes do not always crawl from 1 to
max_hops. In the case of five consecutive hops with no re-
sponse, the probe skip to 255 in a last-ditch effort to reach the
end host and subsequently aborts the traceroute regardless
of the last-ditch result. We believe this behavior is a violation
of the principle of least astonishment and is detrimental to
using these measurements for research purposes.
There are multiples reasons in which a hop doesn’t re-
spond: the IP address of the ingress interface using a private
IP address defined by RFC 1918 and is subsequently dropped
by an access-control list, the network operator performs fil-
tering or control-plane policing of packets which will cause
an ICMP response, or the datagram is dropped by a hop and
will never actually reach the destination. The last-ditch jump
to 255 is a valid optimization technique to test if the data-
gram will ever reach the destination, but aborting the entire
test when either the end host is reachable or the reception
of an ICMP Destination Unreachable causes a loss of critical
path information. In our testing, we observed that 22% of
our traceroutes which could reach the end destination were
aborted early due to this functionality.
In an attempt to understand the motivation for the last-
ditch jump, we reviewed the earliest and latest ATLAS probe
source code available. The logic implementing the skip to 255
was found in both versions of the source code, the earlier of
which dates back to 2013. The functionality is configurable as
a command line flag, but a review of the API documentation
showed no way to set that option. The API source code is
not available; however, an email to the RIPE ATLAS team
confirmed that there is currently no way to change this
behavior through the API. At the time of the measurements,
the ATLAS team had no plans to expose this API.
We also identified an incorrect assumption from a RIPE
blog post which details some security mechanisms in place,
including ’New firmwares are distributed to the probes in-
side the existing communication infrastructure’. A look at
measurements performed on April 30th, 2018 shows that
the ATLAS ecosystem is not on a common firmware level
as the post indicates. On top of the heterogeneity of the
firmware versions, two of the versions, 4910 and 4900, do not
have source code released on their website as of this writing.
Table ?? details the self-reported firmware level of the 126
probes were used in that sample of measurements:
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Figure 10: All emails from network operators
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